



Architecture of SEMPER

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ACTS




Outline

- ◆ **Introduction**
- ◆ **Objectives**
- ◆ **Model**
- ◆ **Architecture**
- ◆ **Outlook**
- ◆ **Conclusions**

Introduction


- ◆ Document Exchange
- ◆ Mail Order Retailing
- ◆ Electronic Publishing
- ◆ Ticketing
- ◆ Subscriptions
- ◆ Information Brokerage
- ◆ Auctioning
- ◆ ...

Electronic Marketplace “Internet”



Introduction

Current Situation



◆ Requirements

- ◆ Integrity
- ◆ Authentication
- ◆ Confidentiality

◆ Some issues

- ◆ Weak cryptography
- ◆ Trust in CA
- ◆ Trust in Peer

Secure Electronic Commerce

- ◆ **More than secure communication ...**
 - ◆ **Multi-party problems:** payments, notarized contract signing, auctioning, copy protection, ...
 - ◆ **Multi-party Security:** limit trust in others, make trust explicit, verifiability of trusted parties
- ◆ **More than payments ...**
 - ◆ **Processes:** Systems must be securely linked, e.g. contract with payment with delivery
- ◆ **More than technical security...**
 - ◆ **Legal and technical foundations:** Digital signatures; registration & certification; secure hardware; unified user interfaces; Dispute handling...


Objectives

Objectives for Architecture

- ◆ **Coherent model as basis**
 - ◆ should be easy to understand ..
- ◆ **Security as driving factor**
 - ◆ security cannot be added later ...
 - ◆ addresses multi-party security requirements
 - ◆ supports dispute handling
- ◆ **Openness**
 - ◆ Extensibility
 - ◆ Uniformity
 - ◆ Generality

Model

Scenario: Buying Airline Tickets ...



Model

Secure Transfer & Exchanges


- ◆ **Transfer & Exchanges**
 - ◆ **Data**
 - ◆ **Statements**
 - ◆ **Payments**
 - ◆ **Credentials**
- ◆ **Security Requirements**
 - ◆ **Authentication**
 - ◆ **Confidentiality**
 - ◆ **Non-repudiation**
 - ◆ **Fairness**



Alice



BobAir



Architecture

Bird's View



Alice




Bob





Architecture


A closer look ...





Architecture

Open Service Block Architecture



Accountability: Implications for Design



Did supposed signer accept liability for such signatures?

Was supposed signer aware of signed contents?

Was supposed signer the creator of a signature?

- ◆ Certificate cannot bind a user *per se*
- ◆ Ideal registration:
 - ◆ CA and user sign a contract
 - ◆ Certification policy
 - ◆ Accepted liabilities
 - ◆ Contents of certificate
 - ◆ User interface
 - ◆ Standard GUIs
 - ◆ Standard presentation SW
 - ◆ “Point of no return”
 - ◆ Secure key handling and signature generation
 - ◆ secrets generated by user
 - ◆ secrets never leave **trusted user device** (e.g., electronic wallet)
 - ◆ Notarization of signature


Commerce Layer

- ◆ **Deals**
 - ◆ business context with negotiated quality of service
 - ◆ secure linkage of commerce transactions
 - ◆ collection of evidence, deal browser & dispute handler.
- ◆ **Commerce transactions**
 - ◆ Extensible class hierarchy of primitive transactions (payments, offers, orders, ..)
 - ◆ Core classes enforce standardized presentation of information to the user and proper authorization
- ◆ **Downloadable extensions**
 - ◆ certification

Architecture



Trusted Interactive Graphical User Interface




- ◆ **Why?**
 - ◆ Never trust a window on an untrusted PC or in a browser ...
- ◆ **How?**
 - ◆ Approximation in software: Dedicated window
 - ◆ Ideal solution: “Electronic wallets” with keypad & display
- ◆ **More general problem: Untrusted Hardware**




Outlook

Need for Trusted User Devices




Outlook

Electronic Wallet: *Design Example*



Back




Front

Conclusions

Conclusions

Sound architecture, solid bricks



- SECA
- liability cover
- deal concept
- fair exchanges
- signed offers/orders
- trusted user interface
- pervasive anonymity
- dispute handling

Supports multiple business models:

- business-to-business, business-to-consumer, private-to-private
- symmetric design

Comprehensive:

- multi-party security at its core
- processes, not just steps
- large set of supported services

Extensible:

- service framework
- generic interfaces
- downloading of modules, BAs